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DEFINING THE BORDERS OF UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL
CONTRACT LAW: THE CISG AND REMEDIES FOR INNOCENT,
NEGLIGENT, OR FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION
ULRICH G. SCHROETER*
I. INTRODUCTION
THE creation of uniform international contract law, as of uniform lawin general, is never all-encompassing.  Instead, uniform law instru-
ments are typically limited in their scope, because the uniform provisions
on which the drafters can agree are limited or because there is no need to
unify neighboring areas of law.  The borders of uniform contract law
thereby created in turn create their own problems, most prominently
among them the need to define the relationship between the uniform law
and the rules of non-unified domestic law.1
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG), this task is particularly important and diffi-
cult when it comes to remedies under domestic law and their applicability
to CISG contracts.2  In such cases, any recourse to local, non-unified law
involves the risk of upsetting the balance of rights and obligations of inter-
national buyers and sellers that has been laid down in the CISG: whenever
domestic law provides a party with a remedy it would not have under the
CISG’s rules, its concurrent application potentially undermines foresee-
ability and legal certainty in international trade.  The arguably most dis-
tinctive CISG features that each party should be able to rely upon are
provisions limiting the access to or the measure of its remedies.  A buyer’s
obligation to give notice of non-conformity to the seller within a reasona-
ble time after he has discovered or ought to have discovered it, under
CISG Article 39(1), plays a significant role in practice, with Article 39(2)
of the CISG cutting off all of the buyer’s remedies when two years after
delivery no notice has been given.3  A party may furthermore only avoid
* Professor of Law at the University of Mannheim, Germany; Director of the
Institute for Corporate Law at the University of Mannheim (IURUM).
1. See FRITZ ENDERLEIN & DIETRICH MASKOW, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW art. 4,
¶ 1 (Oceana Pubs. 1992), available at http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/
enderlein.html#art04a.
2. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. ¶ 58 [2009]
(Isr.) (“[A] complex issue.”); see also Ingeborg Schwenzer & Paschal Hachem, Arti-
cle 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
GOODS (CISG) ¶ 19 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010) (“A difficult and ex-
tremely controversial issue.”) [hereinafter CISG COMMENTARY]
3. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. ¶ 52 [2009]
(Isr.) (discussing application of remedies in tort after period for giving notice of
non-conformity had expired); see also U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods art. 39(1),
(553)
1
Schroeter: Defining the Borders of Uniform International Contract Law: The C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR406.txt unknown Seq: 2 23-JUL-13 11:41
554 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 553
the contract in cases in which the other party has committed a “fundamen-
tal” breach of contract, under Article 25 CISG, thereby making the bur-
densome unwinding of contracts an ultima ratio (remedy of last resort).4
And the damages that a party may claim for a breach of contract may not
exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have fore-
seen at the time of the conclusion of the contract.5
In trying to prevent these and other rules of the CISG from being
circumvented, the solution is generally seen in international uniform law’s
prevalence over concurring bodies of law:6 “Displacing inconsistent do-
mestic law,” so it has been said, “is of the essence of establishing uniform
law.”7  The theoretical foundations on which this accepted outcome is
based are, on the contrary, not uniform.  One approach that could be
described as “international” is pointing to the rules of the CISG itself, no-
tably Article 7(1), and arguing that the CISG’s international character and
the need to promote uniformity in its application require the preemption
of domestic law.8  A different line of argument with a more “national” fo-
cus primarily looks to the contracting states’ domestic legal order that may
explicitly or implicitly grant prevalence to the CISG.  An example for the
first type of rule can be found in the Australian state of New South Wales,
where an express clause in the parliamentary act implementing the CISG
clarifies that “[the] provisions of the Convention prevail over any other
law in force in New South Wales to the extent of any inconsistency.”9  A
non-CISG-specific rule of prevalence is followed in the United States,
where reference has been made to the CISG’s nature as federal law, which
therefore “trumps” state common law and the Uniform Commercial
Code.10  The difference between these approaches may eventually be
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG], available at http://www.uncit
ral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf
4. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 25; see also Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal
Court of Justice], Apr. 3, 1996, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 2364,
2366, 2008 (Ger.); Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 51, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note
2, ¶ 51.
5. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 74.
6. See Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 15, 2000, CISG-
online No. 770 (Switz.); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 4.2; JOHN O.
HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ¶ 73 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009); Ulrich Magnus,
Wiener UN-Kaufrecht (CISG), in J. VON STAUDINGER’S KOMMENTAR ZUM BU¨RGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH MIT EINFU¨HRUNGSGESETZ UND NEBENGESETZEN AT EINL ZUM CISG ¶ 42
(rev. ed. de Gruyter 2013); BURGHARD PILTZ, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT
¶¶ 2–125 (2d ed. 2008).
7. HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 73.
8. See MARTIN KO¨HLER, DIE HAFTUNG NACH UN-KAUFRECHT IM SPANNUNG-
SVERHA¨LTNIS ZWISCHEN VERTRAG UND DELIKT 66 (Tu¨bingen: Mohr 2003); PILTZ,
supra note 6, ¶¶ 2–68.
9. See Sec. 6 Sale of Goods (Vienna Convention) Act 1986 No. 119.
10. See Asante Techs., Inc. v. PMC-Sierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1151
(N.D. Cal. 2001); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG § 2.3 (4th ed.
2012); William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 72, 72
2
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small, however, because even the “national” view tends to incorporate an
international perspective, referring to the CISG’s preamble which stresses
that “the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the inter-
national sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic
and legal systems would contribute to the removal of legal barriers in in-
ternational trade and promote the development of international trade.”
U.S. courts have concluded that the expressly stated goal of developing
uniform international contract law to promote international trade “indi-
cates the intent of the parties to the treaty to have the treaty preempt state
law causes of action,”11 thereby supporting the prevalence of the CISG’s
provisions with an interpretation of the CISG itself.
The prevalence of uniform international contract law is, of course,
only needed and only justified where and as far as its rules attempt to
govern exclusively, and not outside the scope of the CISG’s substantive
coverage.  The borders of the CISG therefore also define the scope of its
prevalence and of domestic laws’ corresponding preemption.  Accord-
ingly, the crucial question is: Where exactly do the borders of the CISG
run?12
II. DEFINING THE BORDERS OF THE CISG: A NOVEL TWO-STEP APPROACH
Describing the substantive scope of the CISG is not easily done, both
when attempted in the abstract and with regard to a particular question.
Commentators have criticized that in many of the pertinent cases decided
under the CISG, no detailed reasoning is given why certain issues fall
within or outside the CISG’s scope of application.13  In Part A below, two
“traditional” approaches that can be identified in case law and legal writ-
ings will be discussed, before an alternative approach will be presented in
Part B.
(2000); John C. Duncan, Jr., Nachfrist Was Ist?  Thinking Globally and Act Locally:
Considering Time Extension Principles of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods in Revising the Uniform Commercial Code, 2000 BYU L. REV. 1363,
1372 (2000); David Frisch, Commercial Common Law, The United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods, and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 503–04
(1999).
11. Asante Tech., 164 F. Supp. 2d at 1151; see also Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr
Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 386
F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004).
12. See Peter Schlechtriem, The Borderland of Tort and Contract: Opening a New
Frontier?, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 467, 470–71 (1988).
13. See Stefan Kro¨ll, Selected Problems Concerning the CISG’s Scope of Application,
25 J.L. & COM. 39, 56 (2005).
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A. “Traditional” Approaches
1. Reliance on CISG Article 4
A significant number of courts and authors turn to Article 4 of the
CISG in order to determine where the exact borders of the CISG run.14
This provision states:
This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of
sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer
arising from such a contract. In particular, except as otherwise
expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with:
(a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or
of any usage;
(b) the effect which the contract may have on the property
in the goods sold.15
By using a strict wording (“governs only”), Article 4 of the CISG at
first sight indeed seems to provide a hard and fast description of the
CISG’s material sphere of application.16  However, this first impression is
soon refuted by the apparent incorrectness of the statement made in its
first sentence: The CISG clearly also governs matters other than the forma-
tion of sales contracts and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from such contracts.17  The CISG notably also governs the
modification of sales contracts, in Article 29, and the obligations of con-
tracting states under public international law arising from the CISG, in
Articles 89–101.18  The first sentence of Article 4 of the CISG could there-
fore in itself be viewed as a misrepresentation, namely one made by the
drafters of the CISG in respect to the CISG’s content.  It would then argua-
bly qualify as a merely “innocent” misrepresentation, as the drafting his-
tory of the CISG indicates that the delegates considered the provision to
14. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Usinor Industeel, 393 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (N.D. Ill.
2005); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Hamm 2010, INTERNATION-
ALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 59, 63 (Ger.); Helen Elizabeth Hartnell, Rousing the
Sleeping Dog: The Validity Exception to the Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 19 (1993); Christoph R. Heiz, Validity of Contracts
Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
April 11, 1980, and Swiss Contract Law, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 639, 647–59
(1987); Rudolph Lessiak, UNCITRAL-Kaufrechtsabkommen und Irrtumsanfechtung,
o¨stJBl 1989 487, 492; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 10, § 2.6; Joseph Lookofsky, CISG Case
Commentary on Pree¨mption in Geneva Pharmaceuticals and Stawski, PACE REVIEW OF
THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS 115
(2004), available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/lookofsky8.html.
15. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 4.
16. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 14, at 115 (“[S]eemingly clear-cut
delimitation.”).
17. See CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, art. 4, ¶ 2. R
18. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 29 (involving modification of sales contracts);
see also id. arts. 80–101 (involving obligations of contracting states under public
international law).
4
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be a correct shorthand description of the CISG’s substantive coverage19—
its lack of precision was apparently overlooked.  In addition, and maybe
equally important, the terms “formation of the contract of sale” and
“rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a
contract” are themselves open to interpretation, thus providing no gui-
dance to courts and arbitral tribunals that could not easier be drawn from
an evaluation of the CISG’s detailed provisions in Part II and III of the
CISG.
In its second sentence, Article 4 of the CISG goes on to list two issues
it is particularly “not concerned with,” namely the validity of the contract
or of any of its provisions or of any usage (subparagraph a) and the effect
which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold (subpara-
graph b).  Notably the “validity exception” in subparagraph (a) has gained
widespread recognition as a supposedly important carve-out from the
CISG’s material scope,20 and a heated discussion has developed about the
need to interpret the “validity” concept autonomously21 or in accordance
with domestic law.22
Contrary to the approach just described, it is submitted that the sec-
ond sentence of Article 4 of the CISG in truth is lacking any delimiting use
because the list of issues it contains is neither inclusive nor exclusive in
nature.23  It is not inclusive because it does not provide that any question
concerning the validity of sales contracts or a contract of sale’s effects on
the property in the goods is per se outside the CISG’s scope—on the con-
trary, it specifically assumes that the CISG might govern such questions
elsewhere in its provisions (“[E]xcept as otherwise expressly provided in
this Convention . . .”).  Since one of the express provisions referred to is
CISG Article 7(2) with its reference to general principles underlying the
CISG, the “except as” caveat makes Article 4’s second sentence a mere
19. See UN DOC. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records 17, art. 14 (using term
“substantive coverage”).
20. See Hartnell, supra note 14, at 4–5; Joseph Lookofsky, In Dubio Pro Conven-
tione? Some Thoughts About Opt-Outs, Computer Programs and Pree¨mption under the 1980
Vienna Sales Convention (CISG), 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 263, 280–81 (2003).
21. See CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, art. 4, ¶ 31; Milena Djordjevic, Article R
4, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
SALE OF GOODS ¶ 14 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis & Maria del Pilar Perales Vis-
casillas eds., 2011); ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 4.3.1; Heiz, supra R
note 14, at 660–61.
22. See KARL H. NEUMAYER & CATHERINE MING, CONVENTION DE VIENNE SUR LES
CONTRATS DE VENTE INTERNATIONALE DE MARCHANDISES: COMMENTAIRE art. 4, ¶¶ 2,
6, 7 (1993); Denis Tallon, Article 79, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES
LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 2.4.3 (Cesare Massimo Bianca &
Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987); see also Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr Labs.,
201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
23. Contra Warren Khoo, Article 4, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 2.2 (Cesare Massimo Bianca &
Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987) (“By specifically enumerating these matters,
the article places it beyond doubt that they are entirely outside the ambit of the
Convention.”).
5
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reference to the need to establish the CISG’s material scope by way of
interpreting all of its provisions.24  In addition, the statement’s introduc-
tory phrase (“In particular . . .”) makes clear that it is not exclusive in
nature, so that issues not covered by the second sentence of Article 4 may
nevertheless be outside the CISG’s scope.  Through the combination of
two opposed exceptions, the provision is thus deprived of any regulatory
meaning, rendering moot which issues it applies to and how its terms
should be interpreted.
At the end of the day, Article 4 of the CISG therefore neither reveals
with certainty which questions are governed, nor which questions are not
governed by the CISG.  In all but the most obvious cases, courts and arbi-
trators have to look elsewhere for guidance.
2. Reliance on Dogmatic Categories of Domestic Law: Contract v. Tort, etc.
Another frequently used approach relies on dogmatic categories in
determining the scope of the CISG and its relationship to domestic law:
The CISG, so it is said, “is about contracts,” and accordingly neither about
“procedure” nor about “tort” or other presumably “non-contractual” areas
of law.25  With respect to the relationship between the CISG and remedies
for tortious behavior that is of primary interest for the purposes of the
present article, this approach has found some support among
commentators.26
a. Case Law Under the CISG: A Mixed Picture
Case law decided under the CISG, however, has been somewhat more
varied in its recourses to the “contract v. tort” dichotomy.  On one end of
the scale is the decision in Viva Vino Import Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.R.L.27
with its generic “The CISG does not apply to tort claims,” a statement that
has been cited with approval in further U.S. cases like Geneva Pharmaceuti-
24. See Christoph Benicke, Article 4, in MU¨NCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM HANDEL-
SGESETZBUCH ¶ 4 (2d ed. 2007); Khoo, supra note 23, ¶ 2.1; ULRICH G. SCHROETER,
UN-KAUFRECHT UND EUROPA¨ISCHES GEMEINSCHAFTSRECHT–VERHA¨LTNIS UND WECH-
SELWIRKUNGEN § 6, ¶¶ 149–51 (2005); contra ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, R
art. 4, ¶ 3.1; PILTZ, supra note 6, ¶¶ 2–125.
25. See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., 313 F.3d
385, 388 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The Convention is about contracts, not about proce-
dure.”); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 11, 2000, CISG-on-
line No. 627 (Switz.).
26. See Michael Bridge, A Commentary on Articles 1–13 and 78, in THE DRAFT
UNCITRAL DIGEST AND BEYOND: CASES, ANALYSIS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES IN THE
U.N. SALES CONVENTION 235, 246 (Franco Ferrari, Harry Flechtner & Ronald A.
Brand eds., 2004); Djordjevic, supra note 21, art. 4, ¶ 10; Joseph M. Lookofsky,
Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales: Problems in the Harmonization of Private
Law Rules, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 409 (1991); Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 286.
27. No. 99-6384, 2000 WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000).
6
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cals v. Barr Laboratories,28 Sky Cast v. Global Direct Distribution,29 and Dingxi
Longhai Dairy v. Becwood.30
The court in Geneva Pharmaceuticals, however, did not stop there.  Cit-
ing Professor Schlechtriem,31 it rather went on to caution: “Just because a
party labels a cause of action a ‘tort’ does not mean that it is automatically
not pre-empted by the CISG.  A tort that is in actuality a contract claim, or
that bridges the gap between contract and tort law may very well be pre-
empted.”32  This line of thought was subsequently picked up by yet an-
other U.S. District Court in Electrocraft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric Motors,
Ltd.,33 where the court—once more citing Professor Schlechtriem34—
said:
Thus, a tort that is in essence a contract claim and does not in-
volve interests existing independently of contractual obligations
(such as goods that cause bodily injury) will fall within the scope
of the CISG regardless of the label given to the claim . . . .  The
question for this Court, then, is whether Electrocraft’s negli-
gence/strict liability claim is, as argued by Super Electric, “actu-
ally . . . a breach-of-contract claim in masquerade.”35
It accordingly moved away from primarily focusing on dogmatic cate-
gories towards considering the substance of the remedy concerned.  A sim-
ilar perspective was also adopted by courts outside the United States.  In
ING Insurance v. BVBA HVA Koeling,36 a Belgian Court of Appeals held that
a party to a CISG contract that commits a fault in the performance of the
contract can only be held liable on an extra-contractual basis if the alleged
fault is a not a fault against a contractual obligation but against the general
duty of care, and if that fault causes other damage than the damage
caused by faulty performance of the agreement.37  In Pamesa Ceramica v.
Yisrael Mendelson,38 the Supreme Court of Israel in turn commenced by
asking the rhetorical question: “Does placing the word ‘tort’ at the top of
28. See Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr Labs., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 286 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
29. See Sky Cast, Inc. v. Global Direct Distribution, L.L.C., No. 07-161, 2008
WL 754734, at *7 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008).
30. See Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., 718 F.
Supp. 2d 1019, 1024 (D. Minn. 2010).
31. See Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 474.
32. Geneva Pharms. Tech., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 286 n.30 (citing Schlechtriem,
supra note 12).
33. No. 4:09-cv-00318, 2009 WL 5181854 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009).
34. See id. at *5 (citing Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 473).
35. Id.
36. Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, Apr. 14, 2004
(Belg.).
37. See id.
38. CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. ¶ 27 [2009]
(Isr.).
7
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the claim release the buyer from the inspection and notice obligations,
and does it deprive the seller of the defences that the [C]onvention pro-
vides . . . ?”39  The court then, in a very carefully reasoned decision, devel-
oped a balanced approach similar to the ones outlined above.  In
concluding, it held that weight should be given to the interests which the
uniform law on the one hand and the domestic law on the other seek to
protect, and that a claim in tort should only be allowed to be heard along-
side the CISG when those interests are not identical.40
Courts in yet other CISG contracting states have generally given even
less weight to the contract/tort dichotomy.  A German court of appeals
ruled that concurrent tort claims, assuming that they were available, would
in any case be barred once the notice of non-conformity under CISG Arti-
cle 39(1) had not been timely given,41 thereby effectively denying an inde-
pendent application of tort rules where a contract between the parties is
governed by the CISG.  Most recently, the German Supreme Court re-
frained from ruling on the relationship between the CISG’s remedies and
claims for damages under domestic tort law—because the additional avail-
ability of tort claims would not have affected the outcome of the pending
case—but its reference to the disputed nature of the question among legal
writers indicates that the Court did not consider the solution to be
obvious.42
b. Discussion
In the author’s opinion, dogmatic classifications or labels like “con-
tract,” “tort,” or “procedure” can and should play no role at all in defining
the CISG’s substantive scope.  The reason is simple: the CISG itself pro-
vides no autonomous definition of these categories, and their contents as
well as limits in domestic laws are often uncertain43 and—most important
in an international uniform law setting—not internationally uniform.
The institution of common law misrepresentation, occasionally char-
acterized as a “strange amalgam of law and equity and of contract and
tort,”44 is one case in point: while innocent misrepresentation (to be dis-
cussed in more detail below) constitutes an instrument of contract law
39. Id. ¶ 54.
40. See id. ¶¶ 69–70.
41. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals Thu¨ringen] May 26,
1998, Transportrecht, Beilage Internationales Handelsrecht [TranspR-IHR] 25, 29
(Ger.).
42. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 2013, NEUE JURIS-
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 304, ¶ 17 (Ger.).
43. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (“Except at the
extremes, the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ precisely describe very little ex-
cept a dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular context is largely deter-
mined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.”).
44. JOHN BURROWS, JEREMY FINN & STEPHEN TODD, LAW OF CONTRACT IN NEW
ZEALAND 302 (3d ed. 2007).
8
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under English law,45 it is regarded as part of tort law in the United
States.46  The consequence would be that remedies for innocent misrepre-
sentation under English law would be preempted by the CISG, while reme-
dies under U.S. law would not—a result that hardly seems convincing,
given that the content of both rules is rather similar.  Uncertainties in clas-
sifying particular remedies are similarly reflected in other parts of the law
of misrepresentation, with liability for negligent misrepresentations under
English law having been referred to as “contract in tort’s clothing.”47
Another example is the “contract with protective effect for third par-
ties,” a legal concept developed by the courts under German law, that a
well-known comparative law scholar once characterized as “a mere curios-
ity.”48  It assumes that contracts have protective effects for non-contracting
parties if the contracting parties’ intent—as determined through interpre-
tation of their contract in accordance with the principle of good faith49—
was such, thus resulting in the third party’s own contractual claim for dam-
ages if one of the contracting partners has breached its contractual obliga-
tions.  In “interpreting” the contract, German courts have often gone far
beyond the wording of the contract and the intentions of commercially
reasonable parties,50 thus e.g., deducing a seller’s intent to extend the
protective effects of a contract with a surveyor to any buyer of the house to
be sold51 and even granting a third party a contractual claim for damages
although, due to a valid limitation of liability clause, the contracting party
itself would not have had such a claim.52  The contractual classification of
expert liability towards third parties can arguably only be explained with a
(thinly veiled) attempt to escape German law’s lack of tort liability for
pure economic losses.  Not surprisingly, third party claims in comparable
situations would be classified differently in other legal systems, with U.S.
law potentially granting a claim in tort53 and Swiss law having created an
extra category “between contract and tort.”54
45. See Michael Bridge, Innocent Misrepresentation in Contract, in 57 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBLEMS 2004 277, 278 (Jane Holder et al. eds., 2004).
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C (1977).
47. A.J.E. Jaffey, Contract in Tort’s Clothing, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 77, 101–03 (1985).
48. 1 HEIN KO¨TZ & AXEL FLESSNER, EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW 253 (Tony Weir
trans., 1997).
49. See BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code], Jan. 2, 2002,
Bundesgesetzblatt 38, § 242 (Ger.).
50. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Die Dritthaftung staatlich anerkannter Gutachter im
deutschen und schweizerischen Recht, in PRIVATE LAW: NATIONAL—GLOBAL—COMPARA-
TIVE: FESTSCHRIFT FU¨R INGEBORG SCHWENZER ZUM 60. GEBURTSTAG 1565 (Andrea
Bu¨chler & Markus Mu¨ller-Chen eds., 2011).
51. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 8, 1995,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 392, 1995 (Ger.).
52. See id. ¶ 25; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] 2010,
NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW] 1277 (1278) (Ger.).
53. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
54. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 23, 2003, 130 ENT-
SCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] III 345, 349 (Switz.).
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As a third and final example, one may refer to the French instrument
of “action directe,” under which sub-buyers who have purchased goods from
an intermediate seller have a direct claim against the manufacturer of the
goods, relating to defects in those goods or to their unsuitability for their
intended purpose.55  In French case law and legal writing, there is agree-
ment that this claim is contractual in nature,56 despite the fact that this
classification is clearly at odds with the privity of contracts.57  After all, the
manufacturer has undertaken no contractual obligation towards sub-buy-
ers later purchasing the goods in the course of a chain of contracts, whose
identity and domicile is generally unknown to the manufacturer.  It is
therefore not entirely surprising that the European Court of Justice58 has
held that, when measured against the yardstick of the categories of EU
law, the French action directe cannot be regarded as a matter relating to a
contract,59 but rather as a matter relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict.60
In doing so, the Court of Justice noted that “it appears that the relation-
ships between manufacturer and sub-buyer are perceived differently in the
Member States,”61 and that in the great majority of them a manufacturer’s
liability in this context is not regarded as being of a contractual nature.62
All of the examples described above have one thing in common: the
dogmatic classification that the respective legal instruments received has
its source in domestic law, and particularities of the respective domestic
law were the reason why some of the instruments received their dogmatic
labels in the first place.  It is submitted that any approach relying on such
categories should therefore not be followed in an international uniform
55. See Michel Cannarsa & Olivier More´teau, The French “Action Directe”: The
Justification for Going Beyond Privity, in EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCERS’ LIA-
BILITY 311 (Martin Ebers, Andre´ Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009).
56. See Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ.,
Oct. 9, 1979, Bull. civ. I, No. 241 (Fr.); Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court
for judicial matters] ass. ple´n., Jul. 12, 1991, Bull. civ., No. 5 (Fr.); Cannarsa &
More´teau, supra note 55, at 312.
57. See Cannarsa & More´teau, supra note 55, at 311.
58. See Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v. Traitements Me´cano-
chimiques des Surfaces SA, 1992 ECR I-3916, ¶ 16 (discussing Article 5 No. 1 Brus-
sels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters of 1968); Case C-543/10, Refcomp SpA v. Axa
Corporate Solutions Assurance SA et al., ¶ 32 (2013) (unpublished) (reviewing
Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 5(1)(a), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4 (EC) on jurisdic-
tion and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial
matters [hereinafter Brussels I Regulation]).
59. See Brussels I Regulation, supra note 58, art. 5(1)(a).
60. See id. art. 5(3); see also Peter Mankowski, in BRUSSELS I REGULATION art. 5,
¶ 200 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter Mankowski eds., 2d ed. 2012).
61. Case C-543/10, Refcomp SpA v. Axa Corporate Solutions Assurance SA et
al., ¶ 38 (2013) (unpublished).
62. See Case C-26/91, Jakob Handte & Co. GmbH v. Traitements Me´cano-
chimiques des Surfaces SA, 1992 ECR I-3916, ¶ 20.
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law setting.63  In essence, it would amount to an interpretation of the
CISG’s material scope in light of domestic law, as represented by the dog-
matic classification of the competing domestic rules of law.  This is argua-
bly incompatible with Article 7(1)’s guidelines, which call for an
“autonomous” interpretation of the CISG’s provisions, including those de-
fining the borders of the CISG.
B. A Novel Two-Step Approach
Against the background of the deficiencies that the “traditional” ap-
proaches described above have shown—most prominently among them
the lack of uniformity created—it seems both necessary and appropriate
to search for an alternative approach which is better in line with the de-
mands made by Article 7(1).  In this spirit, I propose in the following sec-
tion a novel two-step approach designed as a tool allowing for a more
uniform definition of the CISG’s borders.
1. Basic Outline
The two-step approach’s basic formula runs as follows: a domestic law
rule is displaced by the CISG if (1) it is triggered by a factual situation
which the CISG also applies to (the “factual” criterion), and (2) it pertains
to a matter that is also regulated by the CISG (the “legal” criterion).  Only
if both criteria are cumulatively fulfilled, the domestic law rule concerned
overlaps with the CISG’s sphere of application in a way that will generally
result in its preemption.64
The development of this two-step approach and its criteria are based
on the assumption that the CISG’s rules (and not domestic law) must
serve as the starting point in establishing the relationship between the
CISG and concurrent legal rules.65  In developing a suitable methodical
approach, Article 7(1) is the primary provision from which guidance can
be drawn: the directive it provides for courts and arbitral tribunals—to
have regard to the CISG’s international character and to the need to pro-
mote uniformity “in its application”—also needs to be observed when de-
termining the CISG’s scope of application, because any recourse to a
domestic rule of law in place of the CISG effectively means that the latter
is not being applied at all.  It is submitted that the desirable uniform out-
come in this context can best be achieved by combining a factual criterion
with a legal criterion, both of which will be outlined in more detail below.
63. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 4.2; Ingeborg Schwenzer R
& Pascal Hachem, The CISG—Successes and Pitfalls, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 471
(2009).
64. For a further discussion of how the outcome is different only where the
CISG exceptionally governs an issue without doing so exhaustively, see infra notes
207–09.
65. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 27, ¶ 53
[2009] (Isr.); Ulrich Huber, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE IN-
TERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) art. 45, ¶ 50 (Peter Schlechtriem ed., 1998).
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2. First Step: The Factual Criterion
When investigating the factual criterion somewhat closer, it soon be-
comes clear that a fact-related yardstick at least comparable to the descrip-
tion proposed here has been frequently mentioned by commentators in
the past.  Professor Honnold notably argued that all domestic law rules are
displaced, which turn on “the very same operative facts that invoke the
rules of the Convention,”66 and many writers have followed his approach
or have used a similar test.67
a. Reasons
At least two reasons speak in favor of focusing on the facts of cases
covered by two concurring legal rules in order to establish the relationship
between these rules.  First, this focus avoids the difficulties already de-
scribed above68 which inevitably arise when dogmatic categories of domes-
tic law are being relied upon in an international setting.  By looking to the
substance of the rules rather than their label,69 and with this substance
being identified by factual standards, an internationally uniform solution
will likely be easier to reach.  And second, a factual criterion is arguably
more attuned to the viewpoint of merchants for whose benefit, as can be
seen from its Preamble, the CISG’s rules were eventually written.  From
merchants’ perspective, it is primarily important to know which factual
behavior in the conduct of their business will result in what kind of legal
consequences, so that they will be able to adjust their actions accordingly.
Since the legal consequences depend on which legal rules are applicable,
it is sensible to also base the precise definition of the CISG’s material
scope and thereby the relationship between international uniform law and
domestic law on factual circumstances.  Through this use of factual instead
of dogmatic legal standards, one may hope that it is possible for merchants
to foresee which of two conflicting laws will be applied to their case.  To
this end, the criterion prevents factual situations covered by the CISG
from leading to a surprising application of foreign domestic rules, the lat-
ter appearing (from the merchant’s perspective) like the proverbial
“rabbit out of the hat.”70
66. HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 65.
67. See Enderlein & Maskow, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 3.1; CLAYTON P. GILLETTE R
& STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 49 (2000); Heiz,
supra note 14, at 647 (“[F]actual situation triggers a provision of domestic law as
well as a rule of the Convention.”); KO¨HLER, supra note 8, at 67; PILTZ, supra note 6,
¶¶ 2–148; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 63, at 471; Peter Winship, Commentary
on Professor Kastely’s Rhetorical Analysis, 8 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 623, 638 (1988).
68. For a further discussion of the difficulties arising out of dogmatic catego-
ries of domestic law, see supra notes 14–24.
69. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 65.
70. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 28.
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b. The Need for a Second (“Legal”) Criterion
It is submitted, however, that in many cases the factual criterion is not
enough, and that it will often require a second step in order to decide
whether a given domestic law rule is being displaced by the CISG.  This
second step is necessary because the same factual situation may well be
regulated by different rules from different perspectives and for different
purposes, not all of which are exhaustively covered by the CISG.  The fac-
tual criterion alone may therefore be too blunt an instrument for an as-
sessment that does not stop at finding that a factual setting has at all been
regulated, but also takes into account why and to which end it has been
regulated.
The case Stawski Distributing Co. v. Zywiec Breweries PLC,71 decided by
the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in
2003, provides a practical example.  It involved a longstanding business
relationship between a Polish brewery and a Chicago-based importer and
distributor of beer.  The parties had concluded an exclusive distribution
agreement which, according to the court, was potentially governed by the
CISG.72  When the seller notified the buyer that he intended to terminate
the agreement, the question arose whether the provisions of the Illinois
Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act73—a state law in relation to the beer indus-
try which places a number of restrictions on relationships between beer
wholesalers and brewers—could be applied alongside the CISG, or
whether they were preempted.  In case of the Illinois Beer Industry Fair
Dealing Act, the factual criterion addressed above was clearly fulfilled, be-
cause the Act’s applicability was triggered by a factual situation which the
CISG also applied to.  According to its Section 2(B), the Act “shall be in-
corporated into and shall be deemed a part of every agreement between
brewers and wholesalers and shall govern all relations between brewers
and their wholesalers,” thereby also including agreements and relations
between wholesalers and foreign brewers.  Since the CISG in turn also ap-
plies to contracts of sale between brewers and wholesalers as long as they
have their respective places of business in different states, the applicability
of both the Act and the CISG is triggered by the same factual situation.
Authors who exclusively rely on this factor74 would therefore have to con-
71. No. 02 C 8708, 2003 WL 22290412 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 6, 2003).
72. See id. at *2.  The court held that “if this were a typical case, there could be
little dispute that the CISG would apply and be considered the authoritative law on
this subject.” Id.  The published facts of the case do not make clear whether this
assessment was correct, because exclusive distribution agreements only qualify as
“contracts for the sale of goods” in the sense used by CISG Article 1(1) if they
already create obligations between the parties concerning the delivery of goods,
but not if they leave it to the parties to decide at a later stage whether such transac-
tions will be conducted. See Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶
66.
73. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 720/1 (1982).
74. For a discussion of cases that were decided upon factual criteria, see supra
notes 61–62.
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clude that the Illinois Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act is being displaced by
the CISG75—a result that seems premature,76 because the Act was not nec-
essarily enacted in order to address the same type of risk as the CISG.
3. Second Step: The Legal Criterion (or: What’s the Regulated “Matter”?)
As a second step within the two-step approach proposed here, it is
therefore necessary to determine whether the domestic law rule covering
the factual situation at hand also pertains to a “matter” regulated by the
CISG.77  This second step enables courts and arbitral tribunals to take into
account the regulatory purpose and focus of the concurring legal rules,
limiting the CISG’s preemptive effect to domestic laws that pertain to a
matter already regulated by the CISG, but allowing for their parallel appli-
cation where the regulated matters are different.
This immediately raises the question: What’s the “matter”?  The CISG
itself uses the term “matter” first and foremost in Article 7(2) in address-
ing the filling of “gaps” within the CISG’s rules: it provides that
“[q]uestions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are
not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general
principles on which it is based,”78 thereby making clear that “matter” is
understood as a wider term than “question,” with each matter governed by
the CISG potentially involving more than one question.  The term “mat-
ter” furthermore is being employed in Articles 90 and 94, in which the
CISG addresses its relationship towards other instruments of uniform law
or instances of the same or closely related domestic laws that concern
“matters governed by this Convention.”  In this context, there is agree-
ment among commentators that “matter” refers not only to the formation
of the contract of sale and the rights and obligations of the seller and the
buyer arising from such a contract (i.e., the broad areas mentioned in the
first sentence of Article 4), but may also apply to smaller subject areas.79
The only dispute concerns the question of whether a matter in the sense
employed by Articles 90 and 94 requires a certain minimum breadth,80
75. See, e.g., Stawski Distributing Co., 2003 WL 2290412.  This was the position
taken by the Polish brewery in this case.
76. See Lookofsky, supra note 14, at 121.
77. See Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 473.
78. CISG, supra note 3, art. 7.
79. See Franco Ferrari, Article 94, in SCHLECHTRIEM/SCHWENZER KOMMENTAR
ZUM EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT ¶ 2 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 5th ed. 2008);
Magnus, supra note 6, art. 94, ¶ 4; Peter Schlechtriem, Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pas-
cal Hachem, Article 94, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, ¶ 4). But see Johnny
Herre, Article 94, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 4 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis & Maria del Pilar Perales Vis-
casillas eds., 2011).
80. See CHRISTOPH BRUNNER, UN-KAUFRECHT—CISG art. 94, ¶ 3 (2004);
Magnus, supra note 6, art. 94, ¶ 4.
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with examples given by legal writers ranging from consumer protection81
over late payments82 to product liability.83  The preferable opinion rejects
a minimum requirement of this sort, because neither the wording of these
provisions nor policy considerations support such a narrow reading.84
In our context, a matter can be described as a particular risk that is
being addressed in the CISG and thereby allocated between the parties.85
For this purpose, it is not decisive through which legal tools the respective
risk is addressed and allocated; in other words, it is only relevant that the
matter is governed, but not how.  The matter governed by the CISG in
Article 27 is therefore the risk that certain communications get lost during
transmission, independent of the legal consequences attached to such
loss.  And the matter governed in Article 45 is not the buyer’s right to
claim damages or to rely on other remedies, but rather the risk of the
seller’s contractual obligations not being fulfilled and the allocation of the
consequences.
In defining the CISG’s material scope of application, this “legal” crite-
rion is useful because it allows us to make a reasoned assessment of the
CISG’s relationship towards domestic rules of law in cases that fall into the
scope of both legal rules.  When being applied to the constellation in Staw-
ski, it confirms that the district court was eventually right in holding that
the Illinois Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act could be applied despite the
agreement between brewer and wholesaler being governed by the CISG:86
81. See Peter Schlechtriem, Article 94, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVEN-
TION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 4 (Peter Schlechtriem &
Ingeborg Schwenzer eds., 2d ed. 2005).
82. See id.; contra Herre, supra note 79, art. 94, ¶ 4.
83. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 94, ¶ 4.
84. See Schlechtriem, Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 79, ¶ 4; SCHROETER,
supra note 24, § 10, ¶ 40.
85. See CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramic v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 27 [2009]
(Isr.) (providing approaches comparable to, though not necessarily identical with,
position taken here).  The Supreme Court of Israel held that:
[T]he interests which [the buyer] is struggling to protect are not identi-
cal to the interests which the uniform law of the convention seeks to pro-
tect, a distinction which I think should be given weight when making the
decision as to whether to allow a claim in tort to be heard alongside the
arrangements in the convention.
Id. ¶ 70; see also Markus Mu¨ller-Chen, Article 45, in CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2,
¶ 32 (“[T]he [concurrent] remedy cannot be in conflict with the regulatory goals
of the Uniform Sales Law.”).
86. See generally Stawski Distributing Co. v. Browary Zywiec S.A., 349 F.3d 1023
(7th Cir. 2003).  The district court based this (arguably correct) result on a reason-
ing different from the one developed here, namely the fact that the state of Illinois
had promulgated the Act pursuant to the power reserved to states by the Twenty-
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  A duly ratified treaty could
not, therefore, override this reserved power.  On appeal, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit characterized the district judge’s suggestion that
the Twenty-First Amendment entitles states to trump the nation’s treaty commit-
ments to its trading partners as “wholly novel” and vacated the judgment. See id. at
1026.
15
Schroeter: Defining the Borders of Uniform International Contract Law: The C
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-4\VLR406.txt unknown Seq: 16 23-JUL-13 11:41
568 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: p. 553
the Act aims at promoting the public’s interest in fair, efficient, and com-
petitive distribution of malt beverage products by regulating the business
relations of brewers and wholesaler vendors, notably in order to assure
that beer wholesalers are free to manage their business enterprises and
maintain the right to independently establish their selling prices (despite
the typically overwhelming bargaining power of breweries).87  As the CISG
neither attempts to regulate these specific issues arising in the area of beer
distribution nor similar issues in other regulated industries,88 the legal cri-
terion was therefore not fulfilled.
III. DEMONSTRATING THE APPROACH’S PRACTICAL APPLICATION: THE
CISG AND DOMESTIC LAW REMEDIES FOR MISREPRESENTATION
During the early years after the CISG’s adoption, it was the relation-
ship between the CISG and domestic law remedies for mistake that stood
at the center of academic attention.89  More recently, however, the appli-
cability of common law remedies for misrepresentation90 in CISG cases
has started to generate discussions, triggered by an increasing number of
U.S. court decisions in which the issue is being addressed.  The positions
adopted by commentators range from the suggestion that the CISG in
general does not preempt claims for misrepresentation91 to the opposite
position that considers all rescission rights for misrepresentation displaced
by the CISG.92  In this author’s opinion, it is helpful to distinguish be-
tween domestic legal rules providing remedies for innocent misrepresen-
tation, negligent misrepresentation, and fraudulent misrepresentation,
respectively.  Each of these categories will be addressed in turn.
A. Innocent Misrepresentation
Remedies for honest or “innocent” misrepresentations made by a con-
tracting party could be viewed as the example best suited to demonstrate
the dangers inherent in applying concurrent domestic law remedies to
CISG contracts.  In court practice under the CISG, on the contrary, this
constellation has seemingly not yet arisen, with the past cases (as far as
published and accessible) all having involved claims for negligent or
fraudulent misrepresentation.
87. See Illinois Beer Industry Fair Dealing Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 720/
2(A) (West 2009).
88. See Schlechtriem, Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 79, ¶ 39.
89. See Heiz, supra note 14, at 647–48.
90. See INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 214 (2012) (stressing functional comparability of doc-
trines of mistake and misrepresentation).
91. See, e.g., Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 285–86.
92. See, e.g., Bridge, supra note 26, at 243–44.
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1. Definition
In English law, a misrepresentation as such has conventionally been
defined as a false statement of material fact that at least in part induces
entry into a contract with the maker of the statement.93  In the United
States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts uses a comparable, although not
identical, description when speaking of a misrepresentation of a material
fact for the purpose of inducing the other party to act or to refrain from
acting in reliance upon it.94
The “innocent” nature of a misrepresentation is usually defined nega-
tively.  An innocent misrepresentation is a misrepresentation that is
neither fraudulent nor negligent,95 thus resulting in a form of strict liabil-
ity96 whenever this type of honest misinformation gives rise to rights or
remedies on the side of a misinformed party.  The remedies attached to
innocent misrepresentations differ among the common law jurisdictions
that know this institution, although these differences—as will be further
demonstrated below97—are without effect for their relationship to the
CISG.
2. The Factual Criterion
At first glance, the factual criterion within the two-step approach is
clearly fulfilled in those cases:98 Domestic law rules on innocent misrepre-
sentation and the CISG both cover factual situations in which parties nego-
tiating a sales contract exchange information about material facts.
Upon closer scrutiny, certain doubts may emerge when one remem-
bers the well-known dispute about the CISG’s scope with respect to pre-
contractual duties.  After all, the prevailing opinion among commentators
holds that the CISG does not impose pre-contractual duties on the par-
ties,99 given that a proposal made by the (then) German Democratic Re-
public to introduce a general liability for “culpa in contrahendo” was
93. See Bridge, supra note 45, at 279; 1 CHITTY ON CONTRACTS ¶ 6-006 (30th
ed. 2008); see also SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 90, ¶ 17.08 (providing
comparative law point of view).
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977).
95. See CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 93, ¶ 6-094; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977).
96. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) cmt. a (1977).
97. For a further discussion, see infra notes 155–60.
98. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.
99. See MICHAEL BRIDGE, THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: LAW AND PRAC-
TICE ¶ 12.04 (2d ed. 2007); Urs Peter Gruber, Article 14, in MU¨NCHENER KOM-
MENTAR ZUM BU¨RGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH ¶ 12 (6th ed. 2012); PETER HUBER &
ALISTAIR MULLIS, THE CISG: A NEW TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS AND PRACTITIONERS
28–29 (2007); Magnus, supra note 6, art. 4, ¶ 42; Lisa Spagnolo, Opening Pandora’s
Box: Good Faith and Precontractual Liability in the CISG, 21 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J.
261, 291, 309 (2007); Wolfgang Witz, Articles 14–24, in INTERNATIONAL EINHEIT-
LICHES KAUFRECHT Vor ¶ 17 (2000). Contra Michael Joachim Bonell, Vertragsverhan-
dlungen und culpa in contrahendo nach dem Wiener Kaufrechtsu¨bereinkommen 693,
700–01 (1990); Diane Madeline Goderre, Note, International Negotiations Gone Sour:
17
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discussed at the Vienna Diplomatic Conference, but ultimately re-
jected.100  Does this mean that there is in truth no coverage of the same
factual scenarios, because innocent misrepresentation involves the viola-
tion of pre-contractual informational duties which the CISG does not pro-
vide for?
The answer to this question, it is suggested here, must be in the nega-
tive.  At the outset, it should be pointed out that, irrespective of the posi-
tion that one adopts in the abovementioned dispute about pre-contractual
obligations under the CISG, it can hardly be doubted that the CISG covers
some facts that take place at the pre-contractual stage: For once, Part II of
the CISG contains elaborate rules about the two parties’ declarations
through which a contract is formed, namely offer and acceptance.101
Both declarations are by definition made and received during the pre-
contractual phase, since the contract is only concluded once the accept-
ance of an offer becomes effective.102  And second, Article 8(3) refers to
the pre-contractual negotiations between the parties as a factor to be con-
sidered for purposes of interpreting the parties’ declarations and con-
duct.103  That the CISG itself does not regulate the parties’ pre-contractual
duties does therefore not mean that it generally does not apply to any
factual situations at the pre-contractual stage, thereby giving completely
free reign to domestic pre-contractual regulations.
For the purposes of the two-step approach presented here, the deci-
sive factual situation covered by the CISG is the formation of the contract.
This means that the CISG only overlaps with domestic law rules on inno-
cent misrepresentation insofar as they also apply to the formation of a
sales contract, but not as far as they cover misrepresentations made with-
out an ensuing contract formation.  The latter carve-out nevertheless only
insignificantly reduces the degree of overlap as to the factual situations
covered.  Many domestic laws quite similarly restrict the right to claim
damages for innocent misrepresentations made during contract negotia-
tions to cases in which a contract has been concluded, but offer no such
remedy where the representee has refrained from entering into a con-
tract.104  Should a given law on misrepresentation decide otherwise, its
Precontractual Liability Under the United Nations Sales Convention, 66 U. CIN. L. REV.
257, 280–81 (1997).
100. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records at 294–95; see also PETER
SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 57 (Peter Doralt & Helmut H. Hascheck eds.,
1986).
101. See CISG, supra note 3, arts. 14–17 (governing offer); id. arts. 18–22 (gov-
erning acceptance).
102. See id. art. 23.
103. See Goderre, supra note 99, at 279; Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction
to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 54.
104. Compare JOHN CARTWRIGHT, MISREPRESENTATION, MISTAKE AND NON-DIS-
CLOSURE ¶¶ 3–50 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing English law), with E. Allan Farnsworth,
Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 235 (1987) (discussing U.S. law and noting “[i]ndeed, it
18
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rules could generally be applied to false statements made during negotia-
tions that could have led to the conclusion of a CISG contract, but eventu-
ally did not.
The interpretation of the CISG’s scope described above is more im-
portant when it comes to national rules on pre-contractual liability that
may grant a party a right to damages where contract negotiations have
failed,105 but that are not triggered by the incorrectness of statements
made but rather by a party’s decision to break off the negotiations.  In
assessing the applicability of such domestic law rules106 alongside the
CISG, the CISG’s limited “factual” coverage with respect to the pre-con-
tractual stage should not conceal that the CISG covers these situations
through its rules on contract formation in Articles 14–24.  By providing,
on one hand, that no offer can be accepted as long as no proposal has
been made that indicates the offeror’s intention to be bound in case of
acceptance107 or valid offers were duly withdrawn108 or revoked,109 and
stipulating, on the other hand, that a contract is only formed once an
offer has been accepted110 and that the offeree even has a right to change
his mind about acceptances made,111 the CISG stresses the parties’ right
to freely walk away from contractual negotiations before their respective
declarations have become binding.  Domestic law rules providing for dam-
age claims in cases where a negotiation has been broken off are therefore
triggered by factual circumstances also covered by the CISG, although the
latter provides that such factual situations should yield no legal
consequences.112
In conclusion, it can be summarized that the factual criterion within
the two-step approach is fulfilled where the relationship between the CISG
and domestic laws on innocent misrepresentation is concerned.113
3. The Legal Criterion
The legal criterion requires more thought: Do domestic law rules on
innocent misrepresentation pertain to a matter also regulated by the
would seem that a party to failed negotiations might have a claim based on any
misrepresentation, including one by nondisclosure, that upon being discovered
caused the negotiations to fail”).
105. See UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records at 294.  The unsuccessful
proposal by the German Democratic Republic in Vienna would also have covered
such cases. See id.
106. See Farnsworth, supra note 104, at 239–49, 282–84.
107. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 14(1).
108. See id. art. 15.
109. See id. art. 16.
110. See id. arts. 18, 23.
111. See id. art. 22.
112. See Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 63, art. 14,
¶ 29  For a further discussion relating to the fact that national rules on fraudulent
behavior can always be applied alongside the Convention, see infra notes 208–10.
113. See BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶¶ 12.21–.22; HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.
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CISG?  This could be doubted if the matter was framed narrowly, for ex-
ample, as “protection of contracting partners from unintended misinfor-
mation.”  It seems in line with the CISG’s international character,
however, to adopt a more functional view.114  The matter that is indeed
being regulated in both rules is the buyer’s state of knowledge about features of
the goods at the moment of contract conclusion.  The CISG addresses this matter
in a number of provisions in its Part III, thereby preempting concurrent
rules of domestic law:115
a. The Parties’ State of Knowledge About Features of the Goods as
Regulated Matter
It does so first in Article 35(1), albeit only indirectly.  By providing
that the seller must deliver goods that are of the quantity, quality, and
description required by the contract, Article 35(1) refers to the content of
the parties’ sales agreement as understood by the parties.  This common
understanding is to be determined in accordance with the rules on inter-
pretation of party statements and conduct in Article 8,116 with the relevant
point in time being the moment of contract conclusion.117  Article 35(1)
CISG thereby divides the task to inform oneself or the other party between
the seller and the buyer.  If the seller has made a statement about the
quality of the goods and the buyer accepted it, it became part of the con-
tract (as interpreted in light of the negotiations)118 so that the conse-
quences of the delivered goods lacking this quality are governed by Article
45, and not by domestic law rules on innocent misrepresentation.119  If
the parties have mentioned certain technical specifications of the machine
in their contract in a manner that allows a reasonable person in the
buyer’s position to determine the machine’s production capacity, it is up
to the buyer to ask for additional information before concluding the con-
tract if the specifications given are insufficient for his individual
purposes.120
In requiring the goods’ fitness for the purposes for which goods of
the same description would ordinarily be used, Article 35(2)(a) must simi-
larly be read as referring to the “ordinary use” at the moment of contract
formation,121 although the precise point in time will rarely be decisive
114. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1).
115. Note that this is not the only matter regulated in the Convention that
may be the subject of a misrepresentation. See infra notes 188–89.
116. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 224; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Article 35, in
CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, ¶ 7.
117. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 23.
118. See id. art. 8(3).
119. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.
120. Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] Dec. 22, 2000, CISG-
online No. 628 (Switz.); see also CISG, supra note 3, art. 8(2).
121. See Stefan Kro¨ll, Article 35, in THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CON-
TRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ¶ 68 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis
& Maria del Pilar Perales Viscacillas eds., 2011).
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because ordinary uses are not prone to change.  The provision neverthe-
less incorporates a division of informational risks comparable to the one
under Article 35(1) because Article 35(3) declares the seller to not be
liable if, at the time of the conclusion of the contract, the buyer knew or
could not have been unaware of the goods’ lack of fitness for their ordi-
nary use.  In that case, the buyer has no remedy under the CISG122 be-
cause the goods’ non-conforming nature was before the buyer’s eyes to
see.123  Article 35(2)(a) and (3) do, however, impose neither an obliga-
tion on the seller to inform the buyer of such lack of fitness,124 nor an
obligation on the buyer to examine the goods prior to contract conclu-
sion,125 but rather pursue their regulatory goal by granting or taking away
access to the CISG’s remedies listed in Article 45.  Articles 41 and 42 con-
tain a functionally equivalent regulation that deals with the goods’ free-
dom from rights and claims of third parties, and that similarly connects
the availability of buyers’ remedies to the parties’ state of knowledge at the
moment of contract conclusion.  Already at the outset, the seller only owes
the goods’ freedom from those intellectual property rights of which, at the
time of the conclusion of the contract, the seller knew or could not have
been unaware of,126 whereas other (unrecognizable) third party rights127
or rights that the seller only becomes aware of after contract conclusion
do not entail his liability.128  The question under the law of which state the
goods must be free from such rights then partially depends on the parties
“contemplation” regarding the prospective use of the goods at the time of
the conclusion of the contract under Article 42(1)(a).  If, on the contrary,
it is the buyer who knew or could not have been unaware of a right or
claim at the time of the conclusion of the contract, Article 42(2)(a) de-
clares the seller exempt from liability—knowledge only subsequently
gained by the buyer, again, does not yield a similar result.129
With respect to the conformity of the goods, Article 35(2)(b) further
provides that they do not conform with the contract unless they are fit for
any particular purpose “expressly or impliedly made known to the seller”
at the time of the conclusion of the contract.  This provision is another
122. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 46.
123. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 229.
124. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 48.
125. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 35, ¶ 20; HONNOLD, supra R
note 6, ¶ 229; Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 160; Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶
48; PILTZ, supra note 6, ¶¶ 5–52; Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35, ¶ 36.
126. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 42(1).
127. A dispute remains as to whether a sellers’s duty flows from CISG Article
42 to investigate intellectual property. See Ruth M. Janal, The Seller’s Responsibility for
Third Party Intellectual Property Rights Under the Vienna Sales Convention, in SHARING
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LAW ACROSS NATIONAL BOUNDARIES: FESTSCHRIFT FOR
ALBERT H. KRITZER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 203, 213–17 (Ca-
milla B. Andersen & Ulrich G. Schroeter eds., 2008) (referring to “the adequate
allocation of the contractual risk between the parties”).
128. See Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 42, ¶ 16.
129. See id. art. 42, ¶ 19.
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example for the allocation of informational rights and duties through the
CISG: Article 35(2)(b) makes the seller’s liability under the CISG depen-
dent on a particular purpose having been “made known” to him, thereby
indicating that the seller is generally under no duty to enquire about par-
ticular, non-ordinary purposes for which the goods could be used, nor is
he under a duty to inform the buyer about the goods’ lack of fitness for
such purpose.  Once an intended use has been made known to him (with-
out its “contemplation between the parties” being required, as under Arti-
cle 42(1)(a))130 and he has nevertheless entered into the contract, the
seller is liable if the goods are unsuitable for the use.131  If, on the con-
trary, the buyer chooses not to inform the seller about the particular pur-
pose for which he intends to use the goods, he cannot expect
compensation—any information not given by the buyer until after the
contract formation does entail the seller’s liability.132  The CISG also de-
fines autonomously how (“expressly or impliedly”)133 and by whom (in
practice usually by the buyer, but information provided by a third party
should similarly suffice)134 the particular purpose must have been made
known to the seller, thereby displacing standards of information and en-
quiry that may exist under domestic laws.135  In addition, however, Article
35(2)(b) in fine demands that, under the circumstances, the buyer relied
and that it was reasonable for him to rely on the seller’s “skill and judge-
ment” before the seller’s liability can ensue.  The CISG’s latter test is re-
markably similar in wording and purpose to the requirement under the
English law of misrepresentation as stated in Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mar-
don,136 where Lord Denning based liability for damages on the representa-
tion by a man “who has or professes to have special knowledge or skill.”137
This similarity indicates that both legal rules indeed pertain to the same
regulatory matter.
The parties’ state of knowledge after the moment of contract conclu-
sion is furthermore addressed in Articles 38–40: once the buyer has discov-
ered or ought to have discovered the goods’ lack of conformity, he has to
inform the seller within reasonable time under Article 39(1) at pain of
otherwise losing his right to rely on the discernible non-conformity.138  If,
however, it is the seller who becomes aware or cannot be unaware of facts
130. See Janal, supra note 127, at 221.
131. See Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 26.
132. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 35, ¶ 10; KO¨HLER, supra note R
8, at 233; Magnus, supra note 6, art. 35, ¶ 30; Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35,
¶ 23.
133. See Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35, ¶ 22.
134. See Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 112.
135. See Khoo, supra note 23, ¶ 3.3.3.
136. See Esso Petroleum Co. v. Mardon, [1976] Q.B. 801 (Eng.).
137. See id.
138. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 39(1).
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giving rise to a non-conformity after the contract has been concluded,139
Article 40 provides that he in turn must either inform the buyer or lose his
right to rely on the buyer’s insufficient notice of non-conformity.  Compa-
rable rules with respect to third party rights or claims attached to the
goods are contained in Article 43.
In summary, Articles 35 and 38–44 therefore install a delicate web of
awareness-related rules which are based on a balanced distribution of in-
formational risks.140  This distribution should not be disturbed by the ap-
plication of rules of domestic law which may (and often will) allocate these
risks differently.
b. The Party’s State of Knowledge About the Other Party’s Ability to
Perform as Regulated Matter
Similarly, the parties’ state of knowledge at contract conclusion about
their contracting partner’s ability to perform and his creditworthiness is a
matter governed by Articles 71 and 72.141  This has important effects for
the CISG’s relationship towards remedies under national law that are trig-
gered by a party’s innocent but incorrect statements about his or her own
ability to perform or creditworthiness (although negligent or fraudulent
misrepresentations about these issues are arguably more important in
practice).142
Article 71(1) addresses the matter by providing that a party may sus-
pend the performance of his obligations if, after the conclusion of the
contract, it becomes apparent that the other party will not perform a sub-
stantial part of his obligations as a result of: (a) a serious deficiency in his
ability to perform or in his creditworthiness or (b) his conduct in prepar-
ing to perform or in performing the contract.  Article 71(2) supplements
this right of suspension by a right of stoppage in transit if the seller has
already dispatched the goods before the grounds described above become
evident, and Article 72 in turn provides for a right to declare the contract
avoided if, prior to the date for performance of the contract, it is clear that
the other party’s serious deficiency in his ability to perform or in his
creditworthiness will result in a fundamental breach of contract.143
Articles 71 and 72 should be read as offering an exhaustive regulation
of the informational risk distribution about the parties’ ability to per-
139. The relevant point in time is a matter of dispute. See Schwenzer, supra
note 116, art. 40, ¶ 8.
140. See also KO¨HLER, supra note 8, at 231, 256.
141. See ENDERLEIN & MASKOW, supra note 1, art. 4, ¶ 3.1; Karin Flesch, Der R
Irrtum u¨ber die Kreditwu¨rdigkeit des Vertragspartner und die Verschlechterungseinrede, Be-
triebsberater 873, 876–77 (1994); PETER SCHLECHTRIEM & PETRA BUTLER, UN LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL SALES ¶ 261 (2009).
142. See infra notes 165–88 and 189–209, respectively.
143. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 25.
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form,144 thereby preempting concurrent rules of domestic law that deal
with the same matter.145  This regulatory intent becomes particularly ap-
parent when looking at the limitations laid down in the provisions’ word-
ing which relate both to the prerequisites of the remedies provided and to
their effect.  By requiring that the serious deficiency in performance abil-
ity or in creditworthiness has only become apparent after the conclusion
of the contract, Articles 71(1) makes it clear that deficiencies that were
already apparent at an earlier stage—although maybe not positively
known to the other party146—do not result in a right of suspension if the
contract has nevertheless been entered into with the respective party.147
The CISG thereby operates on the assumption that each party will gather
sufficient information about his contracting partner in the run-up to the
contract formation in order to determine the contracting partner’s ability
to fulfill the contract148—if doubts arise, he may give the prospective con-
tracting partner a chance to dispel them or refrain from entering into the
contract (caveat creditor).  Should a party choose to neglect this pre-con-
tractual due diligence and to conclude the contract despite his unaware-
ness, he acts at his own risk.  National laws on misrepresentation are often
based on other (and internationally divergent) disclosure obligations and
are therefore incompatible with the CISG’s regulatory approach in this
matter.
The CISG furthermore provides a structured set of remedies for the
situations discussed here: the rights of suspension and stoppage under Ar-
ticle 71 only lead to a right to avoid the contract if the conditions laid
down in Articles 49, 64, or 72 are met,149 and Articles 45(1)(b), 61(1)(b),
and 74 et seq. govern a party’s right to claim damages150 where the other
party is lacking in his performance abilities.  Domestic law rules on inno-
cent misrepresentation may again provide for a right of rescission, damage
claims, or both under different prerequisites and must accordingly be dis-
144. See Djakhongir Saidov, Article 71, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 16 (Stefan Kro¨ll, Loukas Mistelis &
Maria Del Pilar Perales Viscasillas eds., 2011).
145. See WILHELM ALBRECHT ACHILLES, KOMMENTAR ZUM UN-KAUFRECHTSU¨BER-
EINKOMMEN (CISG) art. 71, ¶ 1 (2000); Christiana Fountoulakis, Article 71, in
SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) ¶ 35 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010);
ROLF HERBER & BEATE CZERWENKA, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT art. 71, ¶ 16
(1991); Magnus, supra note 6, art. 71, ¶¶ 40–43; SCHLECHTRIEM & BUTLER, supra
note 141, ¶ 261. Contra Lessiak, supra note 14, at 493.
146. See Flesch, supra note 141, at 873; Saidov, supra note 144, ¶ 16.
147. See Trevor Bennett, Article 71, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL
SALES LAW: THE 1980 VIENNA SALES CONVENTION ¶ 1.9 (Cesare Massimo Bianca &
Michael Joachim Bonell eds., 1987); Alexander von Ziegler, The Right of Suspension
and Stoppage in Transit (and Notification Thereof), 25 J.L. & COM. 353, 363 (2005).
148. See Fountoulakis, supra note 145, ¶ 24.
149. See Flesch, supra note 141, at 876.
150. See Fountoulakis, supra note 145, ¶ 55; see also Saidov, supra note 144, ¶¶
59–60.
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placed.  Case law under the CISG has confirmed that Article 71 excludes
all legal remedies that are provided under the applicable national law for
the situation where, subsequent to the conclusion of the contract, serious
doubts arise about the other party’s ability to perform his obligations.151
c. Irrelevance of Misrepresentation Becoming Term of the Contract
The qualification of the issues just mentioned as matters regulated by
the CISG must apply irrespective of whether the misrepresentation con-
cerned has become a contractual term or not:152 by providing uniform
rules for the prerequisites under which a certain quality or description of
the goods is “required by the contract” and under which the goods other-
wise “conform with the contract,” the CISG e contrario also defines the con-
ditions under which information exchanged during the contract
negotiations does not trigger a contractual obligation owed by the
seller.153  In the latter case, the CISG therefore implicitly provides that the
seller shall not be subject to any remedies arising from such pre-contrac-
tual information (even if found to be false), thereby comprehensively reg-
ulating the matter and preempting domestic law.  (The situation is
different only where a party acts fraudulently, as will be discussed in more
detail below.)154
d. Irrelevance of Type of Remedy Provided by Domestic Law
What has just been said with regard to the prerequisites for remedies
laid down in the CISG and in domestic law is similarly true for the type of
remedies provided by the respective rules.  If a given matter is being regu-
lated by the CISG, it is therefore the CISG alone which determines what
remedies shall be available to the parties as part of such regulation,
thereby implicitly excluding all other types of remedies that would be
available under concurrent domestic laws.  The CISG’s prevalence over
domestic law accordingly not only secures that the uniform sales law regu-
lates its matters undisturbed, but also how it regulates them.
151. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 12, 1998, docket
No. 2 Ob 328/97t (Austria) (discussing Articles 1(1)(b), 6, 7(2), 38, 39, 40, 44, 45,
71, 73, 74, 75, 76, and 77); see also Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals]
Cologne May 19, 2008, Internationales Handelsrecht 181, 2008 (Ger.) (discussing
Articles 4, 38, 39, 53, 71, and 81, specifically with reference to rights of retention
under domestic law).
152. Contra Khoo, supra note 23, ¶ 3.3.5. See also BRIDGE, supra note 99,
¶ 12.21.  On the differences in English law between misrepresentations that be-
come part of the contract and those that do not, see BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶
12.20.  Note that in cases of (failed) contract negotiations that do not result in any
contract being concluded, the “factual criterion” is not fulfilled. See infra notes
198–201.
153. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 35(1)–(2). But see BRIDGE, supra note 99,
¶ 12.21 (expressing doubts in this respect).
154. For a further discussion, see infra notes 207–09.
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The CISG’s relationship towards domestic laws on innocent misrepre-
sentation is therefore the same irrespective of the type(s) of remedies that
the applicable law attaches to such misrepresentation.  Where the two-step
approach has clarified that domestic law is preempted by the CISG, pre-
emption applies no matter whether the misinformed party would other-
wise have had a right to claim damages (as under U.S. law),155 a right to
rescind the contract (as under English law),156 or a right to rely on the
courts’ discretion to declare the contract subsisting and award damages in
lieu of rescission (as under English law).157  Nor does it make any differ-
ence how the measure of damages under the law of misrepresentation is
calculated158 or that avoidance of sales contracts under the CISG is pro-
spective, while rescission for misrepresentation in common law systems is
retrospective.159  Rights to rescission under misrepresentation law do in
particular not escape preemption because they could be classified as a “va-
lidity” issue under the second sentence of Article 4.160  As earlier dis-
cussed,161 where a given matter is regulated in the CISG, the uniform sales
law has—in the words of Article 4—“expressly provided otherwise.”
4. Conclusion
As a result, domestic law remedies for innocent misrepresentations
relating to matters governed by the CISG—most importantly (but not ex-
clusively)162 to the two issues mentioned above, namely features of the
goods and the other party’s ability to perform respectively his or her
creditworthiness—are preempted by the CISG; an outcome about which
there is wide-spread agreement among commentators.163  All other mis-
representations are not preempted, as for example those concerning the
155. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C(1) (1977).
156. See Misrepresentation Act, 1967, § 2(1) (Eng.); see also CARTWRIGHT,
supra note 104, ¶¶ 4–29.
157. See Misrepresentation Act, § 2(2).
158. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. b (1977) (sug-
gesting that for domestic settings differences in measure of damages may affect
relationship between actions for innocent misrepresentation and actions for
breach of warranty); see also Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No.
4:09-CV-00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009) (“In addi-
tion, Electrocraft seeks identical damages for its negligence/strict liability claim as
it seeks for its breach of contract and warranty claims.”).
159. See Bridge, supra note 26, at 244.  On the lack of practical differences
between prospective avoidance and retrospective rescission in sale of goods cases,
see Bridge, supra note 45, at 285–86.
160. See Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 474. But see Khoo, supra note 23,
¶ 3.3.4.
161. See supra notes 14–24.
162. For a discussion of another issue, i.e., the timeliness of the goods’ deliv-
ery, see infra notes 188–89.
163. See BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶ 12.21; Bridge, supra note 26, at 244; Bridge,
supra note 45, at 303 n.124; CISG COMMENTARY, supra note 2, art. 4, ¶ 18; R
HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240; Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. R
14–24, ¶ 62.
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identity of the seller or of the buyer.164  The answer to the question “can
domestic law remedies for innocent misrepresentation be applied in CISG
cases?” is therefore the proverbial lawyer’s reply: “It depends . . . .”
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
An issue that has arisen more frequently in practice is the relationship
between the CISG and remedies for negligent misrepresentation.
1. Definition
In the United States, the Restatement (Second) of Torts describes a negli-
gent misrepresentation and its consequences as follows:
One who, in the course of his business, profession or employ-
ment, or in any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary
interest, supplies false information for the guidance of others in
their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss
caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the informa-
tion, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in ob-
taining or communicating the information.165
In English law, the functional equivalent reads:
Where a person has entered into a contract after a misrepresen-
tation has been made to him by another party thereto and as a
result thereof he has suffered loss, then, if the person making the
misrepresentation would be liable to damages in respect thereof
had the misrepresentation been made fraudulently, that person
shall be so liable notwithstanding that the misrepresentation was
not made fraudulently, unless he proves that he had reasonable
ground to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was
made the facts represented were true.166
Both concepts thus share the requirement of a lack of reasonable care
(i.e., negligence) on the side of the maker of the statement, although En-
glish law fails to mention this requirement directly: Section 2(1) of the
Misrepresentation Act of 1967 rather focuses on misrepresenting a per-
son’s belief in the statement’s truth.  While it is therefore theoretically pos-
sible that circumstances may exist in which a person may make a statement
without having reasonable ground to believe it, yet in which it would be
held that he was not (having regard to all the circumstances) negligent,167
those cases will be exceedingly rare.  Despite the differences in wording
164. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 240.  On further discussion of misinforma-
tion as to the parties’ identity, see SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 90,
¶¶ 17.35–.36.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552(1) (1977).
166. Misrepresentation Act, 1967, § 2(1) (Eng.).
167. See CHITTY ON CONTRACTS, supra note 93, ¶ 6-068.
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and in regulatory approach, there is accordingly agreement that liability
under Section 2(1) of the Misrepresentation Act, too, is essentially
founded on negligence.168
In the past, a number of U.S. courts have had to deal with the rela-
tionship between remedies for alleged negligent misrepresentations by the
seller and the CISG.  Most of them allowed the application of damage
claims for negligent misrepresentation alongside the CISG.169  The essen-
tial reasoning they gave was brief and simple: “The CISG does not apply to
tort claims,” and therefore claims for negligent misrepresentation are con-
trolled by state law.170  Some commentators agree,171 but others have
rightly criticized this approach for being incompatible with the CISG’s in-
ternational character and its uniform interpretation.172  After all, it relies
on dogmatic categories of domestic law that are not internationally uni-
form.  In the same spirit, a Belgian Court of Appeals held that a lack of
information by the seller in relation to the use of the goods that the buyer
relied upon constituted a contractual breach; therefore, it could not be
used as a basis for extra-contractual liability unless the buyer could prove
that the damage suffered is different than that caused by the seller’s faulty
contract performance.173
2. The Factual Criterion
When resorting to the alternative two-step approach proposed here,
the factual criterion raises the question: Are cases of negligent misrepre-
sentation factual situations not covered by the CISG because the CISG
contains no specific rules on negligence, making negligent behavior an
168. See Gran Gelato Ltd. v. Richcliff Grp. Ltd., [1992] Ch. 560 at 573 (Eng.);
GUENTER H. TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT 350 (11th ed. 2003); see also Bridge,
supra note 45, at 301 (“[P]resumed negligence.”).
169. See Miami Valley Paper, L.L.C. v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting Gmbh,
No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009); Sky Cast,
Inc. v. Global Direct Distrib., L.L.C., No. CIV.A. 07-161, 2008 WL 754734, at *6
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008); Geneva Pharms. Tech. v. Barr Labs., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236,
286–88 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). But see Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Electric Motors,
Ltd., No. 4:09CV00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009).
170. See Sky Cast, Inc., 2008 WL 754734, at *7 (“Thus, negligent misrepresenta-
tion is a tort claim completely different from a claim for breach of contract.  Being
a tort claim, the court concludes that it is not controlled by the CISG, which only
concerns the sales of good[s] between merchants in different countries . . . .”);
Geneva Pharms. Tech., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 286 (“The CISG clearly does not preempt
the claims sounding in tort.”).
171. See Bridge, supra note 26, at 246. But see id. at 244; Khoo, supra note 23, ¶
3.3.4; LOOKOFSKY, supra note 10, § 4.6; Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 280; Lookofsky,
supra note 26, at 409.
172. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 7(1); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 63, at
471.
173. See ING Ins. v. BVBA HVA Koeling, Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of
Appeal] Antwerpen, Apr. 14, 2004 (Belg.).
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“operative fact” that, in the words of Professor Honnold, does not “invoke
the rules of the Convention”?174
The answer is that the factual criterion is fulfilled since both rules do
in fact turn on the same operative facts.  The reason can be found in the
Secretariat’s commentary on the CISG, which states: “In order to claim
damages it is not necessary to prove fault or a lack of good faith or the
breach of an express promise, as is true in some legal systems.  Damages
are available for the loss resulting from any objective failure by the seller
to fulfill his obligations.”175  The CISG accordingly embodies a deliberate
choice that the question of negligence is irrelevant to the buyer’s right to
recover from the seller for damage caused by non-conforming goods.176
It therefore does cover factual constellations in which negligence by a
party is involved, although it is does not require that a party acted
negligently.
3. The Legal Criterion
The second criterion works essentially along the same lines as in cases
of innocent misrepresentation.  Again, the matter that is regulated is the
misinformed party’s state of knowledge at the moment of contract conclu-
sion.  This is supported by the traditional categories within the law of mis-
representation where fraudulent misrepresentations were distinguished
from non-fraudulent misrepresentations, the latter category including the
innocent and the negligent variety.177  The additional factor present in
cases of negligence—the failure to exercise reasonable care—merely af-
fects the measure of damages, but does not change the essential character
of the remedy.
When applying the legal criterion to the three U.S. cases mentioned
above, in which the courts found domestic law rules on negligent misrep-
resentation not to be displaced by the CISG, the results are as follows:
Miami Valley Paper v. Lebbing Engineering & Consulting178 concerned false
statements by the seller according to which the goods (used machines)
were “a very good deal” and the current owner was selling them because of
bankruptcy.  Both were considered by the district court to be mere state-
ments of opinion (“puffery”), insufficient to support a negligent misrepre-
sentation claim and furthermore did not relate to a matter regulated by
the CISG because they neither formed part of the goods’ contractual
174. HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 62.
175. UN Secretariat, Commentary on Art. 41 of the 1978 Draft of the CISG,
cmt. 3, UN Doc. A/CONF. 97/5, Official Records 37, 48, 55.
176. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 73.
177. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552C cmt. a (1977); CHITTY ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 93, ¶ 6-005; TREITEL, supra note 168, at 349–50.  Under
English law, the point became less clear through Hedley Byrne & Company Ltd. v.
Heller & Partners Ltd. and the enactment of the Misrepresentation Act 1967. See
TREITEL, supra note 168, at 349–50.
178. No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009).
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description, nor affected the purposes for which they could be used.179  In
Geneva Pharmaceuticals v. Barr Laboratories,180 the alleged negligent misrep-
resentation consisted of the seller’s failure to disclose that he was no
longer willing or able to supply the buyer (a manufacturer of generic
pharmaceuticals) with the goods (clathrate, a chemical substance used in
the manufacture of pharmaceuticals) under future contracts.181  At first
glance, the issue could be considered a matter covered by Article 71(1)
because it pertained to the seller’s ability to perform.  Upon closer scru-
tiny, however, it becomes clear that the legal criterion under our two-step
approach was not fulfilled.  The alleged misinformation by the seller only
concerned future contracts that would have involved the same type of
goods, but not the performance of the contract at hand, the latter being
the only matter regulated by Article 71(1).182  Both cases were therefore
correctly decided when applying the test suggested here.
In Sky Cast v. Global Direct Distribution,183 on the contrary, the legal
criterion was arguably fulfilled, and domestic law remedies for negligent
misrepresentation should therefore have been considered preempted.184
In that case, the timeliness of the delivery of the goods (light poles that
were needed for an ongoing construction project) stood at the center of
the dispute.  After the parties had agreed on delivery dates in their con-
tract, the seller allegedly provided the buyer with false information con-
cerning the actual time of the upcoming delivery, thereby leading to the
buyer’s claim for negligent misrepresentation when the announced deliv-
ery was late.185  It is submitted that in doing so, domestic law was applied
to a matter exclusively covered by Article 33 (time of delivery) and Articles
45 et seq. (buyer’s rights in cases of late delivery) of the CISG.186
4. Conclusion
In summary, domestic law remedies for negligent misrepresentation
are equally preempted as far as they relate to features of the goods sold or
the ability of one party to perform the contract and therefore—in the ter-
179. See CISG, supra note 3, art. 35(1); see also id. art. 35(2).
180. 201 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
181. See id. at 286.
182. See CISG, supra note 3, art 71(1).  The “substantial part of his obliga-
tions” that Article 71(1) speaks of is a substantial part of the party’s obligations
under the present contract (the performance of which may then be suspended by
the other party), not under future contracts. See id.
183. No. CIV.A. 07-161, 2008 WL 754734 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 18, 2008).
184. See SCHWENZER, HACHEM & KEE, supra note 90, ¶ 49.31.
185. See Sky Cast, Inc., 2008 WL 754734, at *11.  The district court concluded
that the information given by seller had in fact not been false and therefore dis-
missed the claim. See id.
186. Contra Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 475 (mentioning “obligations to
deliver conforming goods in time” as example for topics and interests outside
CISG).
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minology used here—pertain to a matter also regulated by the CISG.187
Again, remedies for other types of negligent misrepresentations remain
applicable, for example, incorrect information about a third party’s will-
ingness to guarantee performance of the contract.188
C. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
This leaves us with the last type of misrepresentation, namely fraudu-
lent misrepresentation.  Does the line of arguments presented above with
respect to negligent misrepresentation also apply to cases of fraud, be-
cause, after all, the CISG operates independently of notions of fault or
lack of good faith?
1. Definition
No, it does not.  Claims for or because of fraudulent inducement,189
fraudulent misrepresentation,190 common law fraud,191 tortious interfer-
ence with business relations,192 arglistige Ta¨uschung,193 absichtliche Ta¨us-
chung,194 duress,195 deceit, or intentional harm all remain applicable
alongside the CISG.  While this result is commonly agreed upon both in
187. See BRIDGE, supra note 99, ¶ 12.21; Michael Bridge, A Comment on “To-
wards a Universal Doctrine of Breach—The Impact of CISG” by Ju¨rgen Basedow, 25 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 501, 510 (2005); HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶ 73; Peter Huber, in
MU¨NCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BU¨RGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH art. 45, ¶ 24 (6th ed.
2012); Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 204; Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 473;
Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 62; SCHWENZER, HACHEM &
KEE, supra note 90, ¶ 49.31; Ingeborg Schwenzer, Buyer’s Remedies in the Case of Non-
conforming Goods: Some Problems in a Core Area of the CISG, 101 ASIL PROC. 416, 421
(2007); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 63, at 471.
188. See Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 62.
189. See Beijing Metals & Minerals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178, 1180
(5th Cir. 1993) (acting under Texas law); Miami Valley Paper, L.L.C. v. Lebbing
Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 26, 2009) (acting under Ohio law).
190. See Dingxi Longhai Dairy, Ltd. v. Becwood Tech. Grp., L.L.C., No. 08-
762, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51066, at *6–7 (acting under Minnesota law).
191. See TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00 Civ 5189,
2006 WL 2463537, at *13–16 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006) (acting under New York
law).
192. See Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd., No. 4:09-CV-
00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *8 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23 2009) (acting under Ar-
kansas law); Viva Vino Imp. Corp. v. Farnese Vini S.R.L., No. CIV.A. 99-6384, 2000
WL 1224903, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2000) (acting under Pennsylvania law).
193. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Hamm, INTERNATION-
ALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 59, 63 (2010) (Ger.) (acting under German law).
194. Cantonal Court St. Gallen, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR] 2009,
161 (Switz.) (acting under Swiss law).
195. See Beijing Metals & Minerals v. Am. Bus. Ctr., Inc., 993 F.2d 1178,
1184–85 (5th Cir. 1993) (acting under Texas law).
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case law196 and in legal writing,197 the precise reasons behind it are not
often spelled out.  In my opinion, they can be described in the manner
explained below.
2. The Factual Criterion
When asking whether domestic law remedies for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation are triggered by a factual situation which the CISG also applies
to, this question cannot be denied simply because a party’s fraudulent in-
tention, i.e., one’s knowledge of the untrue character of one’s representa-
tion,198 is a mere state of mind and as such does not qualify as a fact.  The
state of a man’s mind, as the English Court of Appeals famously put it, “is
as much a fact as the state of his digestion.”199  Where rules on fraudulent
misrepresentation are concerned, the factual criterion is instead fulfilled
because the CISG also covers cases in which the seller is positively aware of
the goods’ non-conformity, but nevertheless concludes the contract.
Some authors, however, have expressed a different view and argued that
the CISG does not address factual situations involving fraud200—a position
which, if followed through, would arguably have to deny parties to CISG
contracts that were induced by fraudulent misstatements any remedies
arising from the CISG.  This differs from the position taken here, which
will be addressed in more detail below.201
3. The Legal Criterion
Rules on fraudulent misrepresentation, however, concern a different
regulatory matter than the CISG’s provisions.  This, again, does not follow
from the fact that many domestic laws treat fraud and its consequences as
a matter of tort law.  The dogmatic classification within national legal sys-
tems should not influence the autonomous interpretation of the CISG’s
scope in accordance with Article 7(1).  Such classification is furthermore
not internationally uniform.  German sales law, for example, until not too
long ago, considered the seller’s fraudulent misrepresentation about the
196. See Zurich Chamber of Commerce, YB Comm. Arb. 128, ¶ 149 (1998).
197. See Benicke, supra note 24, ¶ 19; Johan Erauw & Harry Flechtner, Reme-
dies Under the CISG and Limits to Their Uniform Character, in THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS REVISITED 35, 66 (Petar Sˇarcˇevic´ & Paul Volken eds., 2001); Fountou-
lakis, supra note 145, ¶ 25; Heiz, supra note 14, at 653–54; HONNOLD, supra note 6,
¶ 65; Kro¨ll, supra note 121, art. 35, ¶ 205; Lookofsky, supra note 20, at 280;
Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at 474; Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts.
14–24, ¶ 62; Schwenzer, supra note 116, art. 35, ¶ 49; Schwenzer, supra note 187, at
421.
198. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 526 cmt. a (1977).
199. See Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, [1885] L.R. 29 Ch.D. 459 at 483 (Lord
Bowen L.J.).
200. See HONNOLD, supra note 6, ¶¶ 65, 73.
201. See infra notes 207–09.
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quality of goods as one of the few reasons giving rise to a contractual right
of the buyer to claim damages.202
The decisive reason is that domestic legal rules on fraudulent misrep-
resentation deal with violations of the “obligation of honesty” (as the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts puts it)203 or the “general obligation of honesty
in speaking” (as described by an English author),204 which is a matter dif-
ferent from mere breaches of contractual obligations or from a lack of due
care.  The CISG does not attempt to regulate the specific consequences
triggered by such party behavior.  In the Hague Sales Laws of 1964, prede-
cessors to the CISG of 1980, this point was still expressly clarified.  Article
89 of the Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods (ULIS) stated:
“In case of fraud, damages shall be determined by the rules applicable in
respect of contracts of sale not governed by the present Law.”
The fact that ULIS Article 89 has no explicit counterpart in today’s
CISG should not be read as an indication of the CISG’s position being
different.205  The developments during the drafting stage of the CISG
made clear that the provision was merely left out in an attempt to shorten
the overall length of the CISG’s text, combined with the hope that it
would be possible to adopt a new concurring international instrument to
govern questions of fraudulent party behavior—a plan that eventually did
not succeed.  The lack of a provision along the lines of ULIS Article 89 did
not signal an intent of the CISG’s drafters to include fraud among the
matters regulated by the CISG,206 so that remedies for fraudulent misrep-
resentation can be applied alongside the CISG.
4. Concurrent Applicability of Uniform and Domestic Law
The above-mentioned result of the two-step approach raises one last
question to be addressed in the present paper, namely: Does the fact that
the effects of fraudulent party behavior is not among the matters regu-
lated by the CISG mean that the CISG is displaced in favor of national
rules on fraudulent misrepresentation?  The answer must be “no.”  Rather,
both sets of rules apply alongside each other, leaving the aggrieved party
with the choice of which rule to base one’s claims upon.207  This follows
from an interpretation of the CISG.  The purpose of the CISG’s remedies
is the compensation of parties that have suffered a breach of contract,
regardless of whether the conclusion of this contract was fraudulently in-
202. See BU¨RGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [Civil Code] § 463 (Ger.) (as in
force until December 31, 2001).
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. a (1977).
204. CARTWRIGHT, supra note 104, ¶ 6-01.
205. But see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 10, § 4.6 n.71.
206. See SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 100, at 34; Schlechtriem, supra note 12, at
474.
207. See Cantonal Court St. Gallen, INTERNATIONALES HANDELSRECHT [IHR]
2009, 161 (Switz.); Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Cologne May 21,
1996 (Ger.); Schroeter, supra note 4, Introduction to Arts. 14–24, ¶ 62.
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duced in the first place.  A different interpretation would deprive parties
that suffered fraud in addition to a breach of contract of their remedies
under the CISG, a result that would be irreconcilable with the promotion
of good faith that CISG Article 7(1) demands.  This was also the prevailing
opinion under ULIS Article 89.208  At the end of the day, CISG contracts
obtained through fraudulent misrepresentation accordingly constitute
one of the rare cases that the CISG does govern, but not exhaustively.209
IV. CONCLUSION
Defining the exact substantive scope of the CISG is a difficult but nec-
essary task.  It is necessary because the scope determines over which do-
mestic rules of law the CISG prevails, thereby preempting the concurrent
domestic law’s application,210 and difficult because the CISG itself pro-
vides limited guidance about the method through which this definition is
to be achieved.  This article has discussed two approaches used in this re-
gard in case law and legal writings on the CISG: the reliance on Article
4211 and on dogmatic categories of domestic law as “contracts” and
“torts,”212 and found them both wanting, particularly in light of Article
7(1) calling for an internationally uniform interpretation of the CISG’s
scope.
Against this background, a novel two-step approach has been devel-
oped with the CISG’s Article 7(1) in mind.213  According to this approach,
a domestic law rule is displaced by the CISG if: (1) it is triggered by a
factual situation that the CISG also applies to (the factual criterion), and
(2) it pertains to a matter that is also regulated by the CISG (the legal
criterion).  Only if both criteria are cumulatively fulfilled, the domestic law
rule concerned overlaps with the CISG’s sphere of application in a way
that will generally result in its preemption.  In applying this approach to
remedies for misrepresentation known in common law jurisdictions, it has
been demonstrated that remedies for both innocent214 and negligent mis-
representation215 are preempted by the CISG if—and only if—they per-
tain to matters already regulated by the CISG, notably the buyer’s state of
knowledge about features of the goods at the moment of contract conclu-
208. See Ronald Harry Graveson, Ernst Joseph Cohn & Diana Graveson, UNI-
FORM LAWS ON INTERNATIONAL SALES ACT 1967 104 (1968); Weitnauer, Article 89, in
KOMMENTAR ZUM EINHEITLICHEN KAUFRECHT, EKG, ¶ 3 (Do¨lle ed., 1976).
209. Another case that falls into this general category is arguably that of con-
tracting parties demanding a judgment for specific performance.  While the CISG
in principle grants such a right, Article 28 expressly authorizes the adjudicating
court to refer to “its own law” in order to determine whether such a judgment
should be entered.
210. See supra notes 1–12.
211. See supra notes 14–24.
212. See supra notes 25–63.
213. See supra notes 64–88.
214. See supra notes 93–164.
215. See supra notes 165–88.
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sion or the parties’ state of knowledge about the other party’s ability to
perform.  Remedies for fraudulent misrepresentation, on the contrary,
can always be applied alongside the CISG.216
The methodical approach presented here is no more than a means to
a necessary end, namely the uniform and predictable definition of the bor-
ders of the CISG.  As it is clear that the purpose of the CISG—the creation
of a uniform international law—will be frustrated if it is possible to circum-
vent its provisions by bringing claims under domestic law,217 it is hoped
that the two-step approach may also prove useful in determining the rela-
tionship between the CISG and other instruments of domestic law, thereby
allowing international merchants to foresee which rules will apply to their
cross-border sales transactions.
216. See supra notes 190–210.
217. Cf. CA 7833/06 Pamesa Ceramica v. Yisrael Mendelson Ltd. 27, ¶ 54
[2009] (Isr.).
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